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One comes away from a reading of other recent article 852
boundary prescription cases, which do not merit discussion for
lack of new or important legal questions, with the feeling that
if there is conflicting testimony it can be very difficult to con-
vince a court that a long-standing fence has not been in place
more than thirty years.
LiERATrIvE
In Freestate Industrial Development Co. v. T. & H., Inc.8
it was held that a cause of action for damages based upon an
alleged interference with natural drainage by altering its flow
is a cause of action resulting from an abuse of a servitude owed
by the plaintiff's estate to the defendant's estate, under article
660. Therefore, it was held that the ten-year prescriptive period
applied and not the one-year period for offenses or quasi-offenses.
The court's reasoning is logical, but if this result is compelled
by the Code, one might question the wisdom of the wise
redactors of the Code. The problem of ascertaining facts and
causation of damages ten years after the act might often pose
terrific evidence and proof problems. Although one year may
be too short a period, something less than ten years seems in
order, which raises the question of a need for Code revision.
MINERAL RIGHTS
*George W. Hardy, III
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Prescription-Effect of Operations under Community Lease
The case of Hall v. LeMay' involved one of those increasing-
ly troublesome situations in which co-owners of property en-
tered into a partition and attempted to reserve mineral rights
in indivision. During the life of the mineral rights so reserved,
the various land and mineral owners entered into a lease under
which production was achieved. The well site, however, was not
on that portion of the partitioned estate involved in the litiga-
tion. Thus, it was contended by the owner of the tract in question
that the act of partition had created separate mineral servitudes
on each of the lots resulting from the partition, that there had
38. 188 So.2d 746 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966)
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 191 So.2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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been no operations on the tract in question, and, thus, that the
mineral rights reserved in the act of partition had expired as to
that particular tract. It was the contention of the mineral owners
that the act of partition had not created separate servitudes on
each of the lots resulting from the partition. However, even
assuming that separate servitudes had been created, it was
further urged that the lease in question was a community lease
under which the parties had all agreed that production from
any portion of the leased area would be shared proportionately
by all those joining in the lease.
The lower court determined that the act of partition had
indeed created separate servitudes. However, it further con-
cluded that the lease was a community lease and that the drill-
ing and production which had taken place was sufficient to
interrupt prescription even though the operations took place at
a site not on the tract immediately in question. The court of
appeal eschewed decision on the first issue, and, assuming but
not admitting that the act of partition created separate servi-
thdes, proceeded to dispose of the case by holding that the lease
was a community lease with the result that production on any
portion of the area under lease interrupted the running of pre-
scription against the outstanding mineral rights on the tract
in question.
This case raises the question of what bilateral or multi-
lateral acts of a landowner and a mineral servitude owner will
have the effect of liberalizing the ordinary rules of prescription
so that operations on a tract other than that burdened by the
servitude but nevertheless attributable to the servitude tract in
some manner would have the effect of interrupting the pre-
scription of nonuse accruing against the mineral servitude rights.
In deciding the case the court of appeal cited two earlier de-
cisions2 as authority for the proposition that when a community
lease is executed "the drilling of a single producing well any-
where on the leased premises will maintain the entire lease in
effect, and will also interrupt prescription on all mineral servi-
tudes subject thereto." 3 The cases relied upon are of extremely
doubtful authority insofar as the question of prescription is
concerned in that they deal only with the question whether
operations on one tract in a community lease will maintain the
2. Nabors v. Producers Oil Co., 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917); United Gas
Public Service Co. v. Eaton, 153 So. 702 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
3. Hall v. LeMay, 191 So.2d 720, 722 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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entirety of the lease as between the lessee and the lessors. The
writer finds no clear authority in the jurisprudence for the
proposition stated by the court in this case. In the earlier deci-
sion by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Robinson v. Horton,4
the following language is found:
"Thus it may be seen that the plaintiff and defendants, by
entering into the joint lease contract of January 4, 1935, in
clear and unambiguous terms unitized or integrated their
mineral interests by creating one whole lease in favor of
the lessee in order to have the lands developed and they
are, in turn, to receive royalties from the oil produced from
the land in the proportion that their mineral rights bear to
the whole, which the lessee obligated itself to pay as long
as oil or gas is produced therefrom in paying quantities.
They have contracted; -they are bound by their contract;
and the question of whether the servitudes, owned by the
defendants in these two cases at the time of the confection
of the contract, were actually used by drilling is imma-
terial." (Emphasis added.) 5
Thus, no decision was reached on the issue of prescription.
Other cases( similar to that at bar have touched upon the issue,
but as in the Robinson decision, have not clearly disposed of the
issue of whether operations on one portion of the lease interrupt
prescription as to mineral rights outstanding on another portion.
Thus, the decision of the Second Circuit in Hall v. LeMay7 is the
first clear statement that community lease operations interrupt
the running of prescription accruing against a mineral servitude
though conducted from a site not on the tract burdened by the
servitude.
Certainly parties are free to contract so as to achieve the
result reached in the Hall case. Prior decisions regarding the
effect of voluntary unitization suggest this principle clearly.8
4. 197 La. 919, 2 So.2d 647 (1941).
5. Id. at 930, 2 So.2d at 650.
6. Farrell v. Simms, 209 La. 1072, 26 So.2d 143 (1946); Dabbins v. Hodges,
208 La. 143, 23 So.2d 26 (1945); Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931, 2 So.2d 650
(1941).
7. 191 So.2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
8. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1015, 117 So.2d
575 (1960); Elson v. Mathewes, 224 La. 417, 69 So.2d 734 (1953). These two
cases involve the effect of voluntary unitization of a portion of a servitude
tract. Though they are principally concerned with the effect of such partial
unitization and whether, absent express language in the contract, such
unitization effects some sort of division of the servitude, it is implicit in
their holdings that had the parties contracted in such manner as to include
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Thus, the only question to be raised about this decision is
whether it is wise to infer from the entry of parties into a com-
munity lease that they intended to liberalize the rules of pre-
scription in the manner suggested by the Hall decision. The
court indicated that the mutual benefits of sharing in production
from the entirety of a communitized area are sufficient reason
for the inference of liberalization of rules of use. If the facts are
sufficient to disclose that the lease in question is truly a com-
munity lease, this inference is warranted. However, caution
should be exercised in examining lease contracts to determine
whether a community lease has been executed.
Imprescriptible Mineral Servitudes
A novel question regarding mineral servitudes was con-
sidered in Franks Petroleum v. Hobbs.9 In 1945 W. L. Coyle
conveyed a certain 80-acre tract of land to McClellan, reserving
to himself a mineral servitude with rights to one-half of the
minerals. Shortly thereafter, McClellan conveyed the land to
Hobbs. By judgment of 1951, the United States took title to 74.6
acres of the 80-acre tract by expropriation. The judgment pur-
portedly reserved to Hobbs the mineral rights in the land taken.
Plaintiff operator acquired leases from both contesting groups
of claimants, those claiming under Coyle and those under Hobbs.
A producing well was brought in, and royalties were deposited
in court in a concursus proceeding.
Those claiming under Coyle, the mineral servitude owner
as a result of the original conveyance of the land to McClellan,
asserted that the provisions of R.S. 9: 5806A were applicable and
that their rights under the 74.6 acres taken by the United States
were imprescriptible. Further, calling upon the concept of in-
divisibility, they claimed that the imprescriptibility attaching to
the expropriated portion of the tract extended also to the re-
maining 5.4 acres. The Hobbs claimants asserted that the rights
outstanding in the Coyle group as of the date of acquisition by
the United States Government should be deemed to have pre-
scribed and, under the terms of the judgment by which the
the entirety of the servitude tracts in the units formed, production anywhere
on the unit, though not on the servitude tracts in question, would have inter-
rupted prescription as to the entirety of the included tracts. It might also
be noted that these two decisions are not in all respects consistent as to the
effect of silence of the parties in a unitization agreement regarding the effect
of inclusion of only a part of a servitude tract.
9. 200 So.2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
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United States acquired the 74.6 acres these rights, should be
deemed to be vested in them. The thrust of the argument on
behalf of the Hobbs group was that the provision in R.S. 9: 5806A
for imprescriptibility of minerals on land acquired by the United
States by expropriation should be applied only in favor of the
landowner and not to the owner of an outstanding mineral
servitude at the time of acquisition by the United States. How-
ever, the court turned to the wording of the statute and found
it to be free of ambiguity and directly applicable in favor of
the Coyle group. It stressed the wording of the statute, which
in pertinent part provides that when land is acquired by the
United States and "is by the act of acquisition conveyed sub-
ject to a prior sale or reservation of oil, gas, or other min-
erals or royalties, still in force and effect, the rights so reserved
or previously sold shall be imprescriptible." Thus, the court held
that the land was acquired subject to the prior mineral reserva-
tion by Mr. Coyle and that the rights "so reserved" in the prior
transaction were, under the unmistakable terms of the statute,
imprescriptible.
The court went on to observe that in the absence of the
statute the Hobbs group would have been in no position to
claim ownership of the minerals as the attempted reservation
by Mr. Hobbs in the act of acquisition by the United States was
invalid as to the outstanding mineral rights in the Coyles since
at the time of the acquisition by the United States Mr. Hobbs
did not own those outstanding mineral rights and could not
validly reserve them in favor of himself. Thus, under ordinary
rules of property, absent the statute upon running of prescrip-
tion of nonuse accruing against the Coyle servitude, it would
have reverted to the United States Government. However, by
reason of the statute and because the acquisition was subject to
the prior reservation, the mineral rights previously reserved by
Mr. Coyle were imprescriptible.
Lurking in the background of this decision is the later en-
acted legislation appearing in the statutes as R.S. 9: 5806B which
is applicable to acquisitions by certain named state agencies and
certain general categories of state agencies. The later statute
provides that if the land acquired by a covered state agency is
conveyed subject to a prior sale or reservation still in force, the
rights so reserved or previously sold remain prescriptible for
nonuse. However, upon termination of the oustanding rights
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rather than reverting to the landowner, the state agency, they
are to revert to the person from whom the agency acquired the
lands. It was apparently the argument of those representing the
Hobbs group that R.S. 9:5806A should be construed in pari
materia with R.S. 9: 5806B. On a technical basis perhaps there
is no room for construction of the two provisions in pari materia
as they were not contemporaneously enacted. Nevertheless, there
is a serious question in that there is an obvious difference in
the effect of the two statutes respecting mineral rights out-
standing at the time of acquisition by a government or govern-
ment agency. The court in the Hobbs case was correct in holding
that the statute by its clear and unambiguous wording was
applicable to the Coyle mineral servitude and preserved it inso-
far as the 74.6 acres acquired by the United States was con-
cerned. But there are possible due process and equal protection
questions raised by the difference between the two statutes. The
writer is not aware of any legislatively stated policy reasons for
the distinction between the United States Government and state
agencies insofar as this problem is concerned and is unable to
think of any sound policy reason for such a distinction. The dis-
tinction may be purely arbitrary and thus unconstitutional.
Exactly how to resolve this conflict is a perplexing prob-
lem. Perhaps it might be said that as R.S. 9: 5806B is the later
expression of the legislative will, the earlier statute is uncon-
stitutional. However, much might depend on the context in which
the issue of denial of equal protection or due process is raised.
Under the statute applicable to acquisitions by the United States
it is the landowner at the time of acquisition who is most likely
to be complaining that there is an arbitrary distinction between
his case and that of an acquisition by a state agency under
R.S. 9:5806B. However, if the acquisition in question is one
under R.S. 9:5806B, it will be the owner of the minerals at
the time of acquisition by the state agency who would be most
likely to claim that there is arbitrary discrimination. The exist-
ence of this dilemma is sufficient reason to enact legislation to
attempt to eliminate these discrepancies.
MINERAL LEASES
After-acquired Title Clause
Williams v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas' Co.' put at issue the
validity of an after-acquired title clause in a mineral lease as
10. 193 So.2d 78 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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against a landowner who acquired title subsequent to execution
of the lease by his vendor. In reliance on Calhoun v. Gulf Re-
fining Co., 1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that the
obligation embodied in the after-acquired title clause was merely
personal in nature and that the landowner was not bound by
the obligation contracted by his vendor. The course of following
the prior decision by the Supreme Court in the Calhoun case is
certainly defensible. However, a brief examination of the basic
question entailed in the Williams case is warranted.
The essential problem in this case is similar to that raised
in the reversionary interest cases dealing with mineral servi-
tudes. It has been held that the doctrine of after-acquired title
is, under proper circumstances, applicable to mineral servi-
tudes.12 Thus, if a landowner purports to sell a mineral servitude
at a time when the mineral rights are actually outstanding,
operation of the doctrine of after-acquired title can result in the
vesting of title if the vendor-landowner is owner of the property
at the time the previously outstanding mineral rights revert to
the land. The role of good faith in the operation of the after-
acquired title doctrine in these instances is not definitely deter-
mined.13 Whether knowledge on the part of one or both parties
to the sale of a mineral servitude under those circumstances
would invalidate the transaction under the rule of Hicks v.
Clark 4 is unclear. Nevertheless, it is clear that the doctrine is
not operative if one other than the original landowner is the
owner of the property at the time the outstanding mineral rights
vest.15
Essentially, the court of appeal reaches a similar result
insofar as mineral leases are concerned. In its reliance on the
Calhoun case, there is some mention of the notion that a mineral
11. 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d 547 (1958).
12. Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59 So.2d 693 (1952); McDonald v. Rich-
ard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943). See also White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9
So.2d 433 (1942). The theoretical base for the decision in White v. Hodges is
unclear as the court there spoke of both an obstacle theory under article 792
of the Civil Code and of the after-acquired title doctrine.
13. In White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942), it appeared clearly
that the purchaser was in good faith. In McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155,
13 So.2d 712 (1943), the record reveals that both parties to the oversale trans-
action were apparently aware that at the time of the transaction the land-
owner did not own the minerals purportedly sold. Exactly what the effect
of good or bad faith on the part of one or both parties to the transaction
will be in the future is uncertain.
14. 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
15. Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59 So.2d 693 (1952); McDonald v.
Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943).
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lease is a purely personal contract. Certainly, the running battle
between the legislature and the courts on this issue has gone
on for a long time and appears to be unending as of this date.
However, it seems that it is not really necessary to base the
result reached by the court in this case on the notion that the
mineral lease is a purely personal contract. It is enough to say
that the obligation imported by the after-acquired title clause
is purely personal and is not enforceable against subsequent
owners of the leased property unless expressly assumed by them.
The possibility that an obligation of the kind in question
might be expressly assumed by a purchaser of the property
was the basis for contentions by the original lessee in the Wil-
liams case that its lease remained valid. It was urged first that
the purchaser of the land had taken title under a deed which
expressly subjected his ownership to the outstanding mineral
lease. However, the court held that the insertion of the clause
in the deed subjecting the title to the outstanding mineral lease
was purely for the purpose of protecting the vendor in war-
ranty and did not constitute an express assumption of any of
the obligations of the lease which were purely personal in
nature by the vendee.
Another basis upon which assumption of the obligation was
urged was that in a change of a depository bank form executed
by the purchaser of the land after his acquisition of the property
and reversion of the mineral rights previously outstanding, there
was a clause stipulating that in executing the form the terms,
conditions and stipulations of the lease were ratified, confirmed,
and adopted. The court refused to accept the execution of this
form as an assumption of the obligation under the after-acquired
title clause on the ground that it was unreasonable to assume
that the landowner, in whom title to the previously outstanding
mineral rights had vested at the time he executed the change
of depository form, would have renounced his valuable rights in
favor of the defendant merely to achieve the desired change in
depository banks. Under the precise circumstances of the case,
this is sound. If the obligation in question is considered to be
personal in nature and is not assumed as a result of purchase of
the property, then the execution of the change of depository
form after reversion of the minerals in question could not op-
erate to vest title in the lessee as there would be no cause or
consideration for such a transaction. The court, however, leaves
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open the question whether there would be a different result if
the change of depository form had been executed prior to the
reversion of the mineral rights in favor of the purchaser of the
land. One suspects that the result would have been the same.
Late Payment of Royalties
The decision in Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.16
adds another piece to the puzzle of the effect of late payment or
nonpayment of production royalties. The opinion discloses that
defendant lessee had properly paid royalties on production from
one large unit including almost all of the leased premises. How-
ever, for some thirty months it had failed to pay royalties due
for production from two small units including a lesser portion
of the leased acreage. Under the prior jurisprudence establish-
ing the principle that failure to pay production royalties for an
appreciable length of time without justification amounts to an
active breach of the lease contract,17 the court had held that the
plaintiff was entitled to relief. However, the remedy of can-
cellation was limited to a partial cancellation of the lease. The
question of the propriety of this holding is discussed in the
immediately following section.
Partial Cancellation
As indicated in the preceding discussion, the decision in
Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.18 results in a partial
cancellation of a mineral lease in a case in which the lessor had
prayed for full cancellation and had proven an active breach of
the lease contract. The court, however, limited the cancellation
by preserving to the lessee its rights in the unit on which pro-
duction royalties had been paid. The concept of partial cancella-
tion is rooted in Carter v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.19 in which
the lessor received only partial cancellation as a result of his
failure to appeal from a lower court judgment erroneously
awarding a partial cancellation. The Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged that the lessor would have been entitled to com-
plete cancellation as the result of the lessee's failure diligently
16. 197 So.2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
17. Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964);
Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Bailey v.
Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); see also Broadhead v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 166 So.2d 329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Fawvor v.
United States Oil of Louisiana, Inc., 162 So.2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
18. 197 So.2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
19. 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (1948).
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to develop the premises, but did not grant that relief as the
lessor had failed to prosecute an appeal from the erroneous
judgment of the district court. Partial cancellation has been
awarded in other cases involving failure diligently to develop
the premises and to explore untested acreage. 20 However, in
these cases, the lessor asked only for a partial cancellation. The
concept of the indivisibility of the mineral lease2 ' certainly
sustains the position taken by the lessor in the instant case.
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit refused to award the relief of
total cancellation. In so doing, the court relied on its own prior
decision in Sellers v. Continental Oil Co.2 2 in which it had also
granted a partial cancellation.
In the writer's opinion, there is no authority for these two
decisions. Further, they are contrary to the conceptualism which
has been applied to the Louisiana mineral lease. Nevertheless,
this rather clear departure from prior jurisprudence and existing
conceptualism is sound. Though the concept is distinctly judge-
made law, it is not therefore bad law. The soundness of this
newly announced principle lies in its obvious and reasonable
consideration of the economic position of the industry. In the
Fontenot case the investment of defendant-lessee obviously in-
volved millions of dollars. The only real damage to the plaintiff-
lessor lies in the fact that he is late receiving money to which
he is undeniably entitled. Deprivation of the entire lease and
the opportunity to profit from the immense investment required
to discover and produce oil and gas under modern conditions
seems a harsh remedy indeed under the circumstances. Even the
remedy of partial cancellation is substantial, and in the eyes of
some might be questioned. The situation presented in the Fonte-
not case differs from that in Melancon v. Texas Co.,23 in which
the court found a deliberate use of economic coercion by the
withholding of royalty payments to force the lessor to execute
certain unitization agreements desired by the lessee. In such a
20. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Romero, 194 F. 2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952);
Eota Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 225 La. 790, 74 So.2d 30 (1954); Nunley v.
Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 11 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
21. See, e.g., Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947).
This decision involved application of the concept of indivisibility to a situa-
tion in which a portion of a lease was included in a unit and operations were
conducted on the unit but off the lease premises. The court held that as the
lease was indivisible in nature, the operations in question maintained the
lease in its entirety.
22. 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
23. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
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case of coercion and bad faith, the remedy of full cancellation
is warranted, and the court in the Fontenot case expressly af-
firmed its adherence to that idea. Although the existence of such
a deliberate course of conduct was urged by counsel for plain-
tiff in the Fontenot case, the court found no such fact and on the
basis of what appeared to be the strong natural equities of the
situation refused to grant a total cancellation.
It can thus be said that a new principle has emerged in
Louisiana mineral law in Sellers and Fontenot. It is one which
adds considerable flexibility to the position of the courts in ad-
ministering the remedy of cancellation and which permits the
doing of substantial justice in individual cases rather than the
harsh injustice which might result from conceptual rigidity.
A subsidiary point but one of considerable interest in the
Fontenot case is its consideration of the problem of the exact
date on which cancellation should be granted. The lower court
had granted cancellation as of the date of production from the
sands on which no royalties had been paid. Painstaking scholar-
ship is evidenced by the court's recitation of the fact that in
prior cases the date of cancellation varied considerably, ranging
from the date of the trial court judgment to the date of produc-
tion to the date of judicial demand for cancellation. Exercising
its discretion in effectuating the remedy of cancellation, the
court awarded the remedy as of the date of formal demand by
the plaintiff for dissolution of the lease. It wisely observed that
delay of dissolution until the date of trial court judgment might
place a premium on dilatory tactics by defaulting lessees.
MINERAL ROYALTIES
Relationship of Executive to Nonexecutive Rights
The case of Whitehall Oil Co. v. Eckart2 presents another
facet of the question of the relationship between executive and
nonexecutive mineral interests. In the case in question, land-
owners executed mineral leases reserving a %/ royalty. By sep-
arate agreement they obtained an additional overriding royalty.
The issue presented was whether under the terms of the agree-
ment in question or any general principle of law the mineral
royalty owners were entitled to share in the overriding royalty.
A similar problem was raised in the earlier case of Uzee v. Bol-
24. 197 So.2d 664 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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linger.25 As the Eckart case has been taken up on writs by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana and has not been finally disposed
of as of the date of this writing, the writer feels that comment
would be improper. However, it is sufficient to say that this
problem of relationship between executive and nonexecutive
interests is a growing one and that to date Louisiana's treat-
ment of the area shows evidence of being out of step with the
remainder of the oil and gas jurisdictions in the country. By
the time the next symposium on appellate jurisprudence is pub-
lished the Eckart decision will be final and the writer will have
full opportunity to expose his views on this general question.
Effect of Partition of Land
In Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard26 the problem of the effect of
a partition of land and an attempted reservation of mineral roy-
alty rights in indivision is presented. The court states the issue
presented in the case as follows:
"Did they [the parties to the partition] intend each tract
transferred to be subject to separate mineral royalty reser-
vations which affected that tract alone? Or did they instead
intend for each co-heir to have a single undivided mineral
interest affecting the entire mass of the property partitioned
by the agreements?"
The court then goes on to interpret the particular agreement
as reflecting an intention to create separate mineral royalty
rights on each of the tracts into which the estate in question
was partitioned. Though the judicial technique employed effec-
tively disposes of the case, it also skillfully avoids the very
troublesome question of whether, if the parties intended to
create in each coheir an undivided mineral interest affecting
the entire mass of the property partitioned by the agreements,
such an intention can be legally effected.
Assume the simplified case of A, B, and C who are co-owners
of a tract of land consisting of 120 acres. They desire to partition
the property. Certainly it is possible for A, B, and C individually
to obtain distinct and separate mineral servitudes amounting to
one-third mineral interests on each of the three 40-acre tracts
which might result from a partition. Thus, A would own 40 acres
25. 178 So.2d 508 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1965).
26. 197 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
27. Id. at 676.
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and / of the minerals in his own tract and would have separate
mineral servitudes with a right to one-third of any minerals
produced on the 40 acre tracts falling to B and C. B and C would
obtain similar interests. But it is questionable whether in enter-
ing into a partition A could effectively obtain a result which
would give to him 1/ of the mineral rights in his own land and
a Y3 mineral servitude covering the two 40-acre tracts falling to
B and C as a result of the partition. Here the question lies in
deciding whether B and C can create a single mineral servitude
covering the two lots in question. However, article 745 of the
Civil Code, providing that several estates may be burdened
by a single servitude in favor of a single dominant estate strongly
suggests that this result is permissible. It is even more highly
questionable whether the parties can partition the land and
create a single mineral servitude covering the entire 120 acres
which would be owned in indivision by the three former co-
owners. The increased difficulty of obtaining this result, if tradi-
tional concepts are followed, lies in the basic rule that a man
may not fractionate his title in favor of himself. In support of
permitting such a result, an analogy might be made to article 805
which provides that, although when the ownership of the servi-
ent and dominant estates is united a servitude is extinguished
by confusion, the whole of the ownership of the two must be
in the same hands. In the instant situation, it might be said that
A, B, and C could validly create a single mineral servitude owned
in indivision by the three of them as neither individually nor
in indivision do they own all of the property subjected to the
servitude.
The result reached by the court by interpretation of the
agreement is clearly a legally achievable result. Thus the deci-
sion reached is beyond criticism. However, the questions as to
the validity of conveyances attempting to reach the other sug-
gested results remain unanswered. One may question why parties
should not be allowed freedom to choose either of the two results
which seem questionable. Certainly, the history of jurisprudence
regarding mineral servitudes reflects a strong tendency on the
part of the courts to fractionate mineral servitude holdings so
as to encourage their return to the land. The writer has analyzed
the policy concepts which may be seen as underlying this ten-
dency elsewhere and has expressed the opinion that in terms of
today's industry the major policy factors in the mineral law
should be simplicity and stability of titles and conservation of
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minerals, with a supporting role to be played by the concept
that prescriptibility of minerals aids to some degree in prevent-
ing the centralization of mineral wealth in the hands of estab-
lished commercial interests.28 Certainly any question of con-
servation as a motivating factor in this situation is irrelevant.
As to the matter of simplicity of titles it does not seem that per-
mitting parties to achieve either of the indicated questionable
results measurably complicates the title system. If distributing
mineral wealth is recognized as a valid policy factor, it could be
said that fractionating the mineral holdings in a situation such
as that under discussion at least minimally effectuates that policy.
Some light is cast on this problem by examining whether
there is another available and fully effective means for achieving
the desired results. It does seem that prior to entry into an act
of partition co-owners of land can validly vest mineral rights
in or grant a ten-year mineral lease to a trust or a specially
formed corporation. Subsequently, partition of the surface of
the land itself can be achieved subject to the prior created
mineral rights or mineral lease. In this manner the economic
benefits stemming from utilization of the minerals will be
shared as intended and the desired intent of creating a single
servitude or single mineral lease preserved by operations any-
where on the estate in question will also be achieved. Viewing,
then, the fact that the desired result can be achieved indirectly
by the interposition of another legal personality, it might be
argued forcefully that the courts should permit parties to con-
tract directly for the desired result. Since the functional result
in question can be achieved by other means, there appears to
be little harm which could come to the system of mineral law
from giving effect to the clear intention of parties who desire
to achieve either of the indicated but questionable results. The
availability of articles 745 and 805 strengthens this position.
The fact that mineral royalties, as distinguished from mineral
servitudes, are involved should not require a different result for
the two institutions. Certainly it would be unreasonable to reach
differing results on the arbitrary ground that a royalty is not a
servitude. The two types of interests should be subject to the
same rule in this instance, no matter what course is taken.
28. Hardy, Pubic Policy and Terminability of Mineral Rights in Louisi-
ana. 26 LA. L. REv. 731 (1966).
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CONSERVATION
The decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill29 touches upon what
appears to be a rather sensitive point in the oil and gas industry.
Plaintiff Mobil Oil Co. complained of certain unitization orders
which established participation in unit production from the
Cadeville Sand of the Calhoun Field by means of a formula
giving 60% weight to volumetric computations and 40% weight
to the productive surface area overlying the sand. The field in
question is served by wells on a 320-acre spacing basis. In
February 1962 the field was shut-in, and ultimately the Com-
missioner of Conservation ordered the installation of a recycling
program to avoid retrograde condensation and loss of liquid
phases below ground. Under R.S. 30:9 (D) the Commissioner has
authority to fix unit participation figures. However any order
fixing such participations must assure to all parties insofar as
practical a reasonable opportunity to receive their just and
equitable share of recoverable hydrocarbons.3 0 The just and
equitable share of each tract or producer participating in the
unit is that portion "which is substantially in the proportion
that the quantity of recoverable oil and gas in the developed
area of his tract or tracts in the field bears to recoverable oil and
gas in the total developed area of the field, insofar as these
amounts can be practically ascertained."3' 1 In determining the
just and equitable shares of those participating in the unit
the Commissioner is "authorized to give due consideration to
the productivity of the well or wells located thereon as deter-
mined by flow test, bottom hole pressure test, or any other
practical method of testing wells and producing structures, and
to consider other factors and geological and engineering tests
and data as may be determined by the Commissioner to be
pertinent or relevant to ascertaining each producer's just and
equitable share of the production and reservoir energy of the
field or pool. '3 2
Mobil took the position that in the situation in question
the only formula which the Commissioner could legally use
under R.S. 30:9(D) was a productive acre foot computation.
29. 194 So.2d 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
30. LA. R.S. 30:9(D) and 11(B) (1950). The latter section relates to the
allocation of allowable production. However, it clearly states the principle
that the Commissioner must assure that each producer will have the oppor-
tunity to produce or receive his just and equitable share of recoverable
hydrocarbons.
31. LA. R.S. 30:9(D) (1950).
32. Id.
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In support of this it was argued that expert testimony disclosed
that over 90% of the hydrocarbons in place could be recovered
in a proper cycling program. Further, it was argued that the
facts that such a high percentage of hydrocarbons could be
recovered and that the hydrocarbons according to the isopachous
map adopted by the Commissioner were evenly distributed
throughout the formation meant that factors such as well pro-
ductivity, porosity, permeability, and the presence of connate
water in the formation were irrelevant in fixing participations
in unit production. The Commissioner, however, maintained
that the map was not fully accurate because of the wide spac-
ing of the wells, and thus in determining recoverable hydro-
carbons under each tract factors other than productive acre
feet under the tracts had to be considered.
Two significant legal problems are dealt with in the decision
by the First Circuit Court of Appeal. First is the scope and
standard of review of orders by the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion. It was the Commissioner's position that a substantial evi-
dence rule should be applied in reviewing his orders. How-
ever, the court pointed out that R.S. 30:12 provides that all
pertinent evidence in respect to validity and reasonableness of
the order of the Commissioner complained of is admissible in
any contest of the validity of an order by the Commissioner.
Thus, it was stated that the court could make a full review
of the facts of each case. However, the court limits severely the
basis for its review of the case by saying that the jurisprudence
has firmly established the rule that courts will not substitute
their discretion or judgment for that of the Commission in the
absence of evidence showing such action to be arbitrary.3 3 Thus,
in the final analysis, it appears that the standard of review
set forth by the court is actually a more limited one than the
substantial evidence rule contended for by the Commissioner.
The second question involved in Mobil's argument was
that as a matter of law the Commissioner is required to com-
pute unit participations on a volumetric basis. The court ob-
served that R.S. 30:9(D) expressly permits the Commissioner
to take into consideration such matters as well productivity and
other factors and geological and engineering tests and data. The
court's statement of Mobil's argument may have been some-
33. Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Hussey, 234 La. 1058, 102 So.2d 455 (1958);
Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495 (1942); O'Meara v. Union Oil
Co., 212 La. 745, 33 So.2d 506 (1947).
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what oversimplified. It is the writer's understanding of the argu-
ment that in cases where other factors mentioned by the statute
are irrelevant, or to state the proposition affirmatively, in cases
where volumetric computations can be made, the Commissioner
is under a duty to make such volumetric computations. It is
difficult to argue with this position, for certainly the statute
states that participation is to be on a volumetric basis and that
other geological and engineering factors may be considered.
Thus, it seems that where volumetric computation is possible,
the Commissioner should be regarded as bound to fix partici-
pations on that basis.
The court observed that there was a conflict in the expert
testimony on the computation of productive acre feet with
Mobil's experts stating that a productive acre foot computation
was possible and proper and the experts testifying on behalf
of the Commissioner testifying that there were inherent inade-
quacies in the map of the formation because of the distance
between wells, thus requiring the use of some factor other than
acre feet alone to achieve just and equitable participation. Oddly,
the court observes that none of the experts testifying for the
Commissioner was able to furnish any scientific or mathematical
basis for a 40% surface acreage factor but only expressed the
feeling that this was "a reasonable solution to the problem." The
court was apparently unwilling to say that the utilization of a
surface acreage factor in fixing participations, albeit no scienti-
fic justification could be provided, was arbitrary so as to invali-
date the order of the Commissioner.
This case, aside from the matter of judicial review of com-
mission orders, deals with a rather widespread and difficult
problem in Louisiana. The overwhelming majority of unit par-
ticipation computations are based on surface acreage. It is the
writer's opinion that although the Commissioner certainly is
entitled to consider other and geological factors in fixing unit
participations, when volumetric computations can be made, the
statute requires such computations. Perhaps in the Mobil case
the court was correct in saying that the Commissioner did not
act arbitrarily in using a 40% surface acreage factor. There is
at least some doubt as to the correctness of this holding. Never-
theless, the broader problem is related to the possibility that
in a significant number of instances participation in unit produc-
tion is currently being computed erroneously on a surface acre-
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age basis. Perhaps it is an unsubstantiated hunch, but it is the
writer's feeling that because of the economic cost involved in
making computations and because "marginal" gains and losses
through surface acreage computation are distributed evenly in
the long run when the larger companies operate all over the
state, landowners are the neglected parties in this situation.
A landowner may have only one producing mineral interest
in the state. What to him would be a highly significant amount
of money might in terms of the overall economic picture of his
lessee-operator be inconsequential. The writer has no present
statistical data which can reveal the truth or falsity of this




In the early case of Gay v. Blanchard,1 a question before
the court was whether the bringing of suit against a transferee
of property who had assumed payment of an indebtedness
secured by a mortgage covering the property interrupted the
running of prescription against the original debtor who was
the transferor. In support of this proposition it was argued
that, inasmuch as both the original debtor and the assumer were
bound for the payment of the debt, they were consequently
co-debtors in solido so that the institution of suit against one
interrupted prescription against the other. The court rejected
this contention and held that the mortgagor and the assumer
were not debtors in solido "in the sense of the Code." The opin-
ion recognized, however, that inasmuch as the parties were
bound for the same debt by their different acts at different
times, an imperfect solidarity existed in favor of the creditor.
The holding of the court was, therefore, that a suit against
one co-debtor of the same debt interrupts prescription against
the other only when the co-debtors are bound in solido "in the
sense of the Code," which seems clearly to mean, when by the
use of the term in solido or other equivalent expression they
"clearly show that they intend that each one shall be separately
bound to perform the whole of the obligation. '2 In such event,
the Gay opinion explained, the co-debtors are mandataries of
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2082 (1870).
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